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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — APPENDIX

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questioner described) are excellent examples of deliberate concealment.

Secretary Korth's October 11 letter of resignation to the President gave as his only reason the need "to return to private business to attend to my pressing private affairs." In his prompt reply (October 12) accepting the resignation, Mr. Kennedy made no comment on the reason for it given by Korth, confining his composition to generous—and deserved—praise of the Secretary's "advancement of national security interests," and said these had put "the Nation in your debt." Therefore, the explanation supplied by this exchange, the one the President said he "would like to see" deemed sufficient, stands in the official record merely as this:

Secretary Korth resigned only because the pressure of "private affairs" overcame his dedicated desire to continue to support the leadership of our national defense by the President and Secretary McNamara. * * * Mr. Kennedy's estimate of Korth's service was high and without qualification.

If the press had accommodated the President's stated preference, and let it go at that, the subject would not have been revived by a question later in the news conference. Perhaps the detailed nature of this second inquiry persuaded Mr. Kennedy he must go beyond the official record he previously had said he would like to have accepted as an adequate explanation. However, go beyond it he did, condoning in words a breach of the ethics to which he pledged his administration in the campaign of 1960 that he had already redeemed in action.

SPEEDY RESIGNATION

As soon as he learned of Korth's lapses from this code of official ethics, the President conveyed the word to his Navy Secretary that immediate resignation was in order. In so doing, Mr. Kennedy acted with firmness and promptness in highly favorable contrast to the performances of two previous administrations in comparable circumstances. But by his words at the press conference he strangely diluted his very creditable deed.

The amount of the subscription to TFX loan to General Dynamics by the bank from which Korth had come to public office, said the President, had, after all, "been a relatively small amount of money as bank loans go;" so there was "nothing improper" in the Navy Secretary's participation in the decision to give the contract to General Dynamics. And, as for Korth's letters on Navy stationery, including an offer to the bank to include some of its "best customers * * * in a little party" on the Secretary's official yacht *Sequoia*, the President dismissed them by saying: "This [TFX affair] has nothing to do with any opinion I may have about whether Mr. Korth might have written more letters and been busier than he should have been in one way or another."

WHITE HOUSE ATTITUDE

That part of Mr. Kennedy's news conference comments furnishes only another illustration that the stern ethical attitude of presidential candidates is prone to undergo a softening process when they enter the White House.

The admirable quality in President Truman that evoked greater intensity in his friendship when his friends got themselves in trouble was supplemented by his fierce protective instinct for his party when some of these friends got his administration in trouble, too. And President Eisenhower long and stubbornly justified acceptance of gifts by Sherman Adams that engendered the public disapproval which finally persuaded Adams he was seriously injuring the President by retaining his most influential White House post.

On June 18, 1959, 3 months before Adams' resignation, President Eisenhower gave a news conference his views on the ethical

issue involved, of which the following are the pertinent excerpts:

"A gift is not necessarily a bribe. One is evil, the other is a tangible expression of friendship. * * * Anyone who knows Sherman Adams has never had any doubt of his personal integrity and honesty. * * * But * * * in not being sufficiently alert in making certain that the gifts of which he was a recipient could be * * * misinterpreted * * * as attempts to influence his political actions * * * to that extent he was * * * 'imprudent.' * * * Personally, I respect him because of his personal and official integrity. I need him."

ETHICAL CLEARANCE

The sponsors of the "shakedown" for presentation portraits to judges and campaign funds via testimonial dinners, etc., that have attained a peak of frequency in Washington ask no better ethical clearance than this.

At Wittenberg College, October 17, 1960, Presidential Candidate Kennedy promised that, if elected, he would impose "a single, comprehensive code on conflicts of interest * * * drawing a clearer line between propriety and impropriety * * * protecting the public against the unethical behavior. * * * All America seeks a Government which no man holds to his own interest. * * * The next President must set the moral tone, and I refer not only to his language."

This was the part of the pledge which Mr. Kennedy failed to serve by excusing, in words, the official actions he had, by deed, certified as inexcusable.

Full Text of Chicago Press Conference
With Nyasaland's Prime Minister

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. BARRATT O'HARA

OF ILLINOIS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, October 28, 1963

Mr. O'HARA of Illinois. Mr. Speaker, by unanimous consent I am extending my remarks to include the coverage in the University of Chicago magazine of October 1963, of a press conference in Chicago with Dr. H. Kamuzu Banda, Prime Minister of Nyasaland:

Question. Dr. Banda, is this the first time that you have been back to the United States since your student days?

Dr. BANDA. No, I was here 3 years ago after I came out of jail. You know that I was in prison for 13 months. After I came out it was the American Committee on Africa who invited me here.

Question. Were you happy when you were here as a student?

Dr. BANDA. I was very happy. I was very fortunate when I was here as a student in that I had friends both among colored and white here in this city and elsewhere where I lived. There was a family which claimed me as their adopted son, as long as I lived here.

Question. What was your favorite place when you were here as a student?

Dr. BANDA. Well, Washington Park. You see, I lived at 5925 Indiana Avenue and as a poor boy I couldn't afford to ride the street car. So I would walk through the park to the University of Chicago and that was quite a distance. And when you reached the university, there was a big stone carving. (Dr. Banda here refers to the Lorado Taft sculpture and fountain, at the end of Washington Park where the Midway begins—Ed.)

Question. Dr. Banda, what steps could we take to have better relations as regards racial questions in this country?

Dr. BANDA. I don't think you should drag me into that. All I can say is that I am greatly encouraged to see that the President, his brother, and many other people in this country are doing what they are doing. Remember that during the time I was here as a student things were not as they are now. I am staying at the Palmer House now. I was in the Winter Park Hotel in Washington, I was in the Hilton-Statler in Boston. I couldn't have been in those hotels when I was here as a student. Today what do I read—white boys, white girls, white men, white women march side by side, shoulder to shoulder, with Negroes fighting for the rights not of the white man, not of the white woman, not of the white boys and girls, but of Negroes. The Government is taking a hand to the point of using Federal troops to enable a Negro to go to a university. That didn't happen when I was here before. I believe that things will continue to improve. But of course I stress that I am expressing a personal opinion. I have no intention of interfering in your internal politics.

Question. Dr. Banda, is there a unique role that you feel Nyasaland can play in Africa's evolution?

Dr. BANDA. I think so, I believe in a policy of negotiation when negotiation can work, but of course when negotiation does not work you have no choice. Therefore my role in Nyasaland and my role in Africa is to try to be a mediator where there is conflict. I believe in negotiation. I don't believe in bitterness and that is why I like the British. Now, some people say the British Commonwealth is being dissolved. I say people like that [the British] will maintain their Commonwealth in one form or another for a thousand years to come because they know when to retreat, when retreat is the best policy.

Question. Dr. Banda, do you think that turbulence among the emerging nations of Africa would have occurred in any case, or could it have been avoided by the colonial powers * * * ?

Dr. BANDA (emphatically). It could have been avoided. It could most certainly have been avoided by the colonial powers. Any colonial power which refuses to recognize the right and demands of Africans for self-government and independence is the one that is selling the white man down the river. Communism would have come to Africa if Britain and France had refused to yield to nationalism. The only place I know now where communism is organized as a party at all among Africans is in South Africa. That's because of the policy of apartheid. That is why I would like to see the United States and Britain exercise any kind of pressure on South Africa to change her policy. Because there is where you have danger in Africa. Explosive situation.

Question. Do you mean that South Africa is in danger of going Communist?

Dr. BANDA. I say that the apartheid policy is the breeding ground for communism or any kind of upheaval. Allowing the Africans to organize their own governments is a sure guarantee that there will be no communism. Not only that, but white men will not be driven out of Africa.

Question. Do you regard Nkrumah of Ghana a Communist?

Dr. BANDA. Definitely not. Kwame Nkrumah is not a Communist. He has been accused of that and of being a dictator. He is not. I have known Kwame Nkrumah since 1945, and I don't mind telling you that he is my personal friend, but I am not saying nice things about him because he is my personal friend. I am just speaking the truth. He is not a Communist. He is not a dictator. Remember there was another candidate for the presidency. He lost. When

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Cuba, Plus 1 Year

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. OLIN E. TEAGUE

OF TEXAS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, November 4, 1963

Mr. TEAGUE of Texas. Mr. Speaker, under leave to extend my remarks in the RECORD, I wish to include an article written by Mr. William S. White, editorial writer for the Star, entitled "One Year After Cuban Crisis." I believe Mr. White to be a most forthright writer, and his columns are most penetrating and thought provoking:

ONE YEAR AFTER CUBAN CRISIS

(By William S. White)

Another October finds an immense change in the American mood from that October of a year ago when we stood at the brink of nuclear war over Cuba. Determination and sensible fear sensibly suppressed—but determination above all—these were in the American mind.

The new October has arrived with anxiety largely gone and a new and understandable but also largely unsupported hope and optimism hanging over most of the Nation.

We were right a year ago to stand fast as a country in settled resolve to meet unavoidable peril in the spirit of men prepared to die rather than surrender, even though happily the dice of history turned our way instead of against us. But we are wrong now, as it seems to me, in having rushed over, in a single 12 months, from the thick but not ably rational gloom of October, 1962, to the very nearly irrational, best-of-all-possible-worlds attitude prevalent in October 1963.

THE WHEAT SALE

The partial nuclear test ban with the Soviet Union, though a defensible enterprise and though just possibly some herald of a true easing in the cold war, has not yet either ended that war or given any assurance whatever of the identity of its eventual winner.

From much that is happening now, however, one might suppose that if the worst was not already past then a good bit of the worst was in sight of being over. So we talk happily of wheat sales to the Russians—an appealing notion no less to hard-line conservatives than to soft-line liberals, for conservatives are traders and trade is an honorable underpinning of the very capitalist system itself.

We talk of cutting back on our multi-billion-dollar space program—and this is good to hear by both sets of different reasons. The conservatives naturally would like to save the money. The liberals have long been resentful at those billions being set aside for the moon when it all might be spent on dozens of earthy welfarist schemes hatched or in incubation.

But wheat deals with the Russians, no matter how momentarily helpful to our farm surplus problem, would nevertheless undeniably strengthen the Russian where they are weak. Have we waited for 17 years for this weak spot in order now to dash in to fill it—and without, apparently, demanding anything in return except the price of the wheat itself?

And should we really reduce the space appropriation even though it is quite true that the President has renewed suggestions that we might cooperate in space research with the Soviet Union? Surely not, if we remain aware of the towering central fact that the power which in future is first in space will be first as well in this world we live in.

What the President said, at any rate, never meant we should lessen our own exertions. It only restated an old American policy in offering certain cooperative ventures to the Soviet Union, as we have offered so many others, if, as and when the Soviet Union might like really to cooperate.

WISE APPROACH NEEDED

We still intend to be first in space, as Vice President LYNDON JOHNSON has just pointed out in behalf of the administration. Nothing will change that, unless Congress and country insist upon heedlessly withholding the means to do it. And a little cooperation from the Russians—in the unlikely event it was given—would do no harm to our central purpose.

But even greater than the need for a wise, calm-minded approach to all these specific questions is the need for a national spirit which rejects any notion that the game has about been won.

Some say we need as well to shun the opposite notion that no concessions whatever should be made in the cold war. To this the proper answer is "yes"—but. It is "yes," wherever such a concession is clearly matched by Soviet concession and wherever refusal would be mere hysterical reflex. It is "no" wherever concessions are made simply in some vague notion that we could thus, in some iffy way, somehow improve the international atmosphere.

What Happened to President Kennedy's "Profiles in Courage" in Korth Case?

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. H. R. GROSS

OF IOWA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, November 4, 1963

Mr. GROSS. Mr. Speaker, the veteran correspondent of the New York Times, Mr. Arthur Krock, writes as follows in that newspaper on November 3, 1963:

At Wittenberg College, October 17, 1960, Presidential Candidate Kennedy promised that if elected he would impose "a single, comprehensive code on conflicts of interest . . . drawing a clearer line between propriety and impropriety . . . protecting the public against the unethical behavior . . . All America seeks a government which no man holds to his own interest . . . The next President must set the moral tone, and I refer not only to his language."

At his press conference on November 1, 1963, President Kennedy was asked these questions:

Question. Mr. President, do you think the letters that Secretary of the Navy (Fred) Korth wrote made his resignation advisable, and was requested?

Answer. I think the letters which Mr. Korth and I exchanged, I think, explain the situation as I would like to see it explained.

Question. Mr. President—

Answer. Mr. Korth, I think, worked hard for the Navy and he indicated his desire to return to private life and I accepted that decision. But I think he worked hard for the Navy.

Later in the same press conference, the questioning on the same subject was renewed as follows:

Question. Mr. President, Navy Secretary [Fred] Korth had some correspondence which indicated he worked very hard for the

Continental National Bank of Fort Worth while he was in Government, as well as for the Navy, and that during this same period of time that he negotiated, or took part in the decision on a contract involving that bank's—one of that bank's best customers, the General Dynamics firm. I wonder if this fulfills the requirements of your code of ethics in Government, and if, in a general way, you think that it is within the law and proper?

Answer. In the case of the contract, the TFX contract, as you know, Mr. Mollenhoff, that matter was referred to the Department of Justice to see whether there was a conflict of interest and the judgment was that there was not. That is No. 1.

No. 2, the amount of the loan to the company, that bank was one of a number of banks which participated in a line of credit and it was relatively a small amount of money, as bank loans go. So in answer to your question, I have no evidence that Mr. Korth acted in any way improperly in the TFX matter. It has nothing to do with any opinion I may have about whether Mr. Korth might have written more letters and been busier than he should have been in one way or another.

The fact of the matter is, I have no evidence that Mr. Korth benefited improperly during his term in office in the Navy, and I have no evidence, and you have not, as I understand the press has not produced any, nor the McClellan committee, which I would indicate that in any way he acted improperly in the TFX. I have always believed that innuendoes should be justified before they are made, either by me and the Congress or even the press.

What has happened to the Kennedy "Profiles in Courage?" What has happened with respect to his bold and reassuring words as spoken when he was a candidate for the presidency; when, for political purposes, he was pointing a finger at the Eisenhower administration and the Sherman Adams-Goldfine episode?

As Mr. Krock says:

As soon as he learned of Korth's lapses from this code of official ethics, the President conveyed the word to his Navy Secretary that immediate resignation was in order . . . But by his words at the press conference he strangely diluted his very creditable deed.

Mr. Speaker, at this point and for the information of my colleagues, I submit for printing in the RECORD the entire article as published in the New York Times on Sunday last:

THE KORTH CASE: KENNEDY'S EXPLANATION OF THE NAVY SECRETARY'S RESIGNATION EXAMINED

(By Arthur Krock)

WASHINGTON, November 2.—President Kennedy expressed a desire common to occupants of his office whom a subordinate has embarrassed when asked at his news conference if he thought certain letters written by Navy Secretary Korth made the resignation of this official "advisable" and if the President had requested it. "I think," he replied, "the letters which Mr. Korth and I exchanged are the—explain the situation as I would like to see it explained."

But whether or not Mr. Kennedy's choice of words was inadvertent, no predecessor has arrayed himself with such candor on the side of the proposition that the press should not explore the background of official explanations of events in Government that, on their face and in the attendant circumstances, are plainly a coverup of the actual situation. For the letters the President referred to (which were not, of course, the letters his